Welcome
I arrived at the conference site a few minutes early to find out
that our first session was to take place four blocks away in the
Congressional Auditorium underneath the Capitol. After opening
remarks, ASPO co-founder and president Jim Baldauf spoke to the need
for "Truth in Energy" in taxpayer funded agencies like the EIA and
DOE and how these agencies should be more responsive to ASPO
concerns about the forecasts they produce.
Next on the agenda were speeches by representatives
Mike Honda and
Roscoe Bartlett. Honorable
Bartlett especially impressed me as an excellent speaker of
undaunted courage and completely in command of the facts. No doubt
this has to do with his previous career as a scientist and engineer
in NASA and the military. By his own reckoning, Bartlett has given
52 hour long speeches on Peak Oil in the House of
Representatives. I'm not sure what strings ASPO director Jan Mueller
had to pull to get permission to use the Congressional Auditorium
but it was an excellent beginning to the conference.
Peak Oil Update: Timing, Trends, Consequences
Chris Skrebowski focused on the importance of emerging markets in
any attempt to assess future prices and availability for oil. He
pointed out that the bulk of recent growth in supply is actually
coming from "other liquids" such as NGL and ethanol. He estimates
that current spare capacity is about one million barrels per day. Of
greatest concern was his statement that oil companies are now
investing in projects that require a per barrel price that will
"break the economy" (>$100/bbl). He suggested that this is because
the growth in demand is expected in non-OECD countries where the
economic utility of oil is much higher than in countries like the
United States and that non-OECD economies will be able to bear these
high prices. (More of Chris' insight on this topic can be found
here.)
Next up was William Catton. His beautiful voice and old-school
professorial style were a delight to listen to even if his
presentation was a very general one for the technical people in the
audience. He spoke of our ever increasing use of energy and the
evolution from homo sapiens to what he terms HOMO
COLOSSUS. His most concrete suggestion was that economic
stimulus today will not have the same affect as in 1938 because he
believes we have by now extracted most of the energy resources of
our nation. He anticipates a future with rising death rates and
resource wars.
Jeff Rubin, as great an entertainer as communicator, spoke
without slides and made several points crystal clear. Having an
economist that can speak clearly without the typical economic mumbo
jumbo and is not afraid to point out economic stupidity where he
sees it reminded me at times of the writings of John Kenneth
Galbraith. Here are the bullets I jotted down:
- Oil prices affect economies.
- The US congress is guided by economists.
- Economists' basic assumption is: potential growth =
productivity growth + population growth.
- Basic assumption of potential growth of 3% is completely
disconnected from natural resource limitations.
- Any growth below potential growth means you can "step on the
gas" with stimulus.
- China is buying T bonds to keep Chinese inflation down in
China.
- Chinese inflation is driven by food and energy prices
denominated in dollars.
- Our economy can no longer grow at the rates expected because
we are in an expensive oil environment.
- Any efforts to stimulate growth toward 3% will fail and be
counterproductive.
- America will eventually default on its debt -- currency
depreciation is a form of default
Jeff also explained how Greece's defaulting would likely lead to
Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland defaulting. Greece's largest
industry is tourism. So is Portugal's. If Greece defaults, and goes
back to the Drachma, it will suddenly be a very cheap vacation spot.
Portugal will need to default to match, and so on. Rubin also talked
about the fact that including the PIIGS in the Euro keeps the Euro
lower than it otherwise would be. If the PIIGS leave, then the
currency for the remaining countries will rise, leaving the
remaining countries with a problem selling their goods. Germany is
the #2 exporter after China. So Europe has a huge problem.
Adapting to the End of Cheap Energy: Critical Factors
Richard Heinberg addressed the need to reform the discipline of
economics and the belief in infinite growth. Any reasonable version
of economics should reflect natural limits and the impact of
industrial processes. Richard also talked about the fact that
inequality can only be tolerated if the national pie is growing. Now
that it isn't, we have a problem. He believes we cannot develop
alternative energies fast enough, so we have to expect a less mobile
society going forward.
Chris Martenson spoke of our need for national energy priorities
and asked: "What is the solution space?" He emphasized the
importance of "stories" and noted that our national budget has
almost nothing for renewables. Clearly, energy is not part of our
national story. He believes we might be able to craft a new national
narrative around "Energy stewardship is what we value."
One thing I appreciate tremendously about Chris is that he
understands the importance of "framing" and "storytelling" in
getting a message across. He has a scientific approach toward
getting his message across and has learned through trial and error
(and observation and measurement) the importance of crafting
different stories, each appropriate for a specific audience.
Angelina Galiteva was a newcomer to the conference. She currently
serves on the Board of Governors for the California Independent
System Operator and is CEO of
NEOptions, a provider of turnkey solar PV solutions. Like the
solar people I met at Opal Financial's
Clean & Green Forum,
Angelina was very optimistic about the promise of solar. She
believes that technology will allow us to retain most/all of the
trappings of a modern society with 100% renewables in a generation
or two. In the United States she sees major policy obstructions to
the adoption of solar PV. She was involved in the creation of
Germany's Feed-in-Tariff and says the key features of that
successful program are the TLC's: Transparency, Longevity, Certainty
and Consistency. A PV installation in California requires a large
amount of paperwork from different governing bodies depending on
location whereas Germany has a simple 2-page document across the
entire country. She pointed out that German job growth in the solar
and wind sector is significantly higher than in other sectors and
that Germany has installed twice as much solar PV as the US with a
little more than a quarter of US population.
Angelina's take-home message was that people should stop
complaining about the problem and should start taking action on
anything that will be part of the solution. She sees solar as a big
part of that solution and is doing her utmost to promote it. It's
hard to argue with that attitude though there was plenty of
skepticism at the conference along with complaints that solar
advocates take little account of the fossil fuels embedded in their
production.
Roger Bezdek was the final speaker and called our attention to
the lack of any meaningful national plan for an oil emergency. His
concern is that any decline in oil production will lead to an oil
shock and there will be huge public demand to "Do something!" He
expects that rationing will be the most politically acceptable
outcome as we have don that before. Most of his presentation
concerned the complexity and details of implementing a rationing
plan. Take home message -- it's complex.
China and the Middle East: Implications for U.S. Energy Security
Michael Klare was snowbound and unable to attend and was replaced
by Kjell Aleklett as first speaker. Kjell discussed the importance
of giant fields. By his reckoning, 1% of global oil fields currently
produce 65% of crude oil. New discoveries are less frequent than in
previous decades and a diminishing list of export countries includes
many that we may not consider allies. Here is the current list of
exporters ranked by 2010 EIA oil export volumes:
1. Saudi Arabia, 2. Russia, 3. Iran, 4. United Arab Emirates, 5.
Nigeria, 6. Kuwait, 7. Norway, 8. Angola, 9. Algeria, 10. Iraq, 11.
Venezuela, 12. Libya, 13. Kazakhstan, 14. Qatar, 15. Canada, 16.
Azerbaijan, 17. Mexico, 18. Oman, 19. Columbia, 20. Sudan , ...
The list alone should give one pause. Except for Norway, Canada
and perhaps Mexico, these are not paragons of enlightened,
democratic society. Kjell expects Norway to cease exporting in 2035
due to depletion. The Saudi recovery factor is currently 56% and he
expects production of near 12 mbd until 2028. But pressurizing
fields will require a very high price. He believes that Asia will
outcompete the West for available exports and that Russia will not
be able to export as much as the EIA expects. Already, exports to
(imports by) OECD nations have declined by 5 mbd and he anticipates
another 10 mbd decline over the next 10 years because of increasing
internal consumption in the oil producing nations.
This was a natural segue to the next speaker, Jeffrey Brown.
Jeffrey presented his Export Land Model and the case for paying
attention to Peak Exports rather than Peak Production if you live in
an importing nation. I agree completely with his emphasis on net
export decline as being hugely important to oil security in OECD
nations. Because I know the ELM story so well, I took few notes.
Lastly, Minqi Li presented his analysis of China's use of coal.
He mentioned using data from China's "coal reserve base" as the best
open, regularly updated Chinese government number regarding coal.
Minqi noted that China produced 3.2 billion tons of coal in 2010 of
which 780 million tons came from Inner Mongolia. In the first eight
months of 2011 production has reached 2.5 billion tons of which
Inner Mongolia alone has contributed 625 million tons. He expects
China to reach a national production of 3.6 billion tons this year
including more than 1 billion tons from Inner Mongolia. He sees
continued growth in coal production/consumption until 2030. (This
was disputed by Kjell.) Minqi sees coal as China's primary energy
source until China reaches "peak energy" around 2035. [Corrected
to reflect Minqi Li's input.]
The End of Growth
Richard Heinberg spoke quite literally about "the end of growth".
Point by point, he argued:
- Cheap energy led to mass production which led to advertising
and credit.
- Payment of debt requires future growth.
- Increasing debt for consumers is increasing wealth for banks
leading to increased power for financials.
- We are living at the end of history's greatest credit
bubble.
- Our economic future will have persistent high unemployment,
declining income and net worth, financial instability.
- We need to build local resilience, but it is at odds with
economic efficiency.
- Rapid economic growth is an artifact of the fossil fuel age.
- We can have a better quality of life with reduced
consumption.
I basically agree with this thesis and give a hearty "Amen!" to
8. But I also believe that the world is, as it always has been, a
very heterogeneous place and that some communities are already well
on their way toward local resilience. Oil shocks will arrive but
will not affect all nations or all regions and towns equally
William Catton spoke again in his lovely stentorian voice and
reminisced a little about his happy childhood during the Depression.
His main message is that our finite world is ... well ... finite and
that non-renewable resources are ... umm ... non-renewable. One
clever insight he left us with is the idea that our species has
progressed over millennia from foragers to farmers in our quest to
provide our bodies with fuel. The current mad dash in search of
fossil fuels in Earth's nooks and crannies means that we have
completed the circle and returned once again to our forager past.
Nice imagery.
Jean Laherère was last to speak and described the widespread
confusion in the definition of simple concepts such as units, heat
content, density, etc. There is little consistency and
there are few rules or standards among companies and nations about
how to report. As usual, Jean showed lots of busy charts but his
take-home message was this: It is difficult to create a clear
message when the wording, units and components of "oil" are in
constant flux. (With all due respect to Jean's important analytical
work over the years, I would like to suggest that it is also
difficult to create a clear message with dozens and dozens of overly
crowded charts. Synthesis is sometimes more important than detail
when explaining.)
The Shale Gas Rush: Boom or Bust?
Art Berman moderated a panel on shale gas that addressed the
(negative) environmental impact of shale gas drilling in western
Pennsylvania. I learned a tremendous amount from this late evening
session but was disappointed that no one from the industry side was
present despite Art's best efforts to find someone. (The lack of the
industry perspective was made more poignant by the fact that I had
gone out to dinner with an employee of Chesapeake Energy just before
this session. One of the advantages of this conference is direct
access to people from all sides of the energy issue.) Despite my
strong environmental leanings, I would have enjoyed having a
technically oriented shale gas proponent as part of the panel.
The first speaker of the evening was Cornell Engineering
Professor Anthony Ingraffea who gave a spectacular 20 minute primer
on fracking, more properly called High Volume SlickWater Fracturing
with Long Laterals (HVSWFLL). Here are the Cliff Notes:
- shale plays are typically ~100' thick
- 4 components in the modern method:
- horizontal wells,
- high volumes of slickwater frac fluids
- multi-stage fracking
- use of multi-well pads
- while each of these techniques is old, the combination is
new
- horizontal wells are long
- slickwater has hydrocarbon lubricants to reduce viscosity
- A 16-well pad uses : 417 million gals of water, 78 k tons of
sand, 8 million gals of frac chemicals, 500 frac intervals, 10k
foot laterals, 40k hp for fracking pumps
- fracking is spatially intense --> lots of pads
- main concerns:
- spatially and temporally intense, heavy industry
- potential migration of hydrocarbons (methane escapes
outside of 5% of wells)
- methane is a potent greenhouse gas
- he is VERY much against HVSWFLL
Next up was Bob Howarth, a Cornell ecologist. He described how an
estimated 1.9% of total methane production from a well can be
inadvertently released during the 2 week frac fluid blowback period
as the well is prepared for production. He asserted that shale gas
drilling has significantly more methane leakage than conventional
gas drilling methods and that, because of this, shale gas actually
contributes more to GHG warming than coal or diesel.
Rob Jackson runs a water chemistry lab at Duke University. Being
careful not to declare causation, he showed a graph with a very
strong correlation between water well distance from a shale gas
drill site and the amount of methane detected in water samples. His
lab has not, however, detected frac fluids in any water wells. He
said it looks like methane leaks up through bad casing jobs rather
than geological fractures and believes that better regulation,
better construction and better enforcement can help a lot. New
regulations in Pennsylvania will include 'presumptive liability' for
any water well contamination that is observed within 2500' feet of a
drill site as opposed to 1000' feet earlier. He believes this kind
of regulation is actually a win for both the public and for industry
as it clearly delineates where liability ends.
The session finished with Amy Mall, policy analyst from the NRDC,
generally describing the negative environment impacts that are
possible with shale gas drilling. Her position was that improved
regulation and enforcement can resolve many of the trouble areas
associated with shale gas production.
Dinner Conversation: Energy concerns in Austria
At the speakers' dinner (which actually took place on Friday) I
enjoyed a conversation with Georg Günsberg of ASPO Austria. Having
been an exchange student in Vienna, I was curious about the level of
awareness and concern in Austria. He said that there was a teachable
moment in 2008 during the Russia-Ukraine gas spat when many
thousands of central Europeans in nations like Slovakia were left
without heat in the dead of winter. Luckily for Austria, they have
4-6 months of natural gas in storage and they came through without
any major shortages. According to Georg, concern about energy is not
particularly high at the moment. Austria has long had efficiency
built into their building codes and they are now putting up
entire
apartment blocks that meet Passivhaus standards. Austria is a
small country with dense urban cores, an excellent rail system and
already high gasoline prices. Austrians (sample size n=1) seem
little concerned about reduced mobility in the face of more
expensive liquid fuels.
Take Home Messages
If I had to choose the most valuable points I took away from day
1 I would probably include:
- The idea that oil has a much higher utility in developing
nations than it does in OECD nations and that this will allow
them to drive the price well above $100/bbl.
- Solar advocates enthusiasm is undaunted as solar PV
continues to show price declines and increasing adoption rates.
- The current list of top oil exporters is scary.
- Pennsylvania needs to do a better job of regulating the
shale gas industry
Keep an eye out for a recap of Day 2.
(Many thanks to Gail, Brian, Rembrandt, Chris and Art for
valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.)
COMMENT:
Obviously subsidies are a factor, especially the more extreme
examples, e.g. Saudi Arabia & Venezuela, but the consumption
trends are pretty obvious too. Note that year over year annual
oil prices rose for seven of the eight years from 2002 to 2010,
with all post-2005 annual oil prices exceeding the $57 level
that we saw in 2005. The key question is what happens going
forward.

We added something new this year, "ELM, the Prequel." The
following chart assumes that "Export Land" peaked in 2000, with
production increasing at 5%/year from 1990 to 2000, then falling
at 5%/year from 2000 to 2010 (similar to the North Sea).
Consumption (in red) rose at 2.5%/year from 1990 to 2010. We are
focused of course on Net Exports, shown in green. Note that on
the upslope of production, unless the rate of increase in
consumption exceeds the rate of increase in production, the rate
of increase in net exports will exceed the rate of
increase in production. But on the downslope of production,
unless consumption falls at the same rate as the rate of decline
in production (or at a faster rate), the net export decline rate
will exceed the rate of decline in production, and the
net export decline rate will accelerate with time:

As expected, our data base shows that the rate of increase in
Top 33 net oil exports (5.1%/year) exceeded the rate of increase
in production (4.6%/year) from 2002 to 2005. But from 2005 to
2010, the rate of decline in net oil exports (1.3%/year)
exceeded the (very slight) rate of decline in production
(0.1%/year). Note that net exports went from +5.1%/year from
2002 to 2005 to -1.3%/year from 2005 to 2010.
The following chart shows "Claims on Production" by the Top
33 net oil exporters in 2005 (BP + Minor EIA data). If we
extrapolate the 2005 to 2010 rates of change in Top 33
production, Top 33 consumption and Chindia's net oil imports,
then Available Net Exports (ANE, i.e., Global Net Exports not
consumed by China & India) would fall from about 40 mbpd in 2005
to about 21 mbpd in 2020. Based on these extrapolations, a
negligible production decline from 2005 to 2020 would result in
approximately a 50% decline in the volume of oil available to
importers other than China & India.
If we assume a 1.0.%/year production decline rate from 2010
to 2020, ANE fall to about 15 mbpd in 2020.

Note that US net oil imports increased at 11%/year from 1948
to 1970, when we peaked. From 1970 to 1977, US net oil imports
increased at 15%/year (EIA). In 1978, net imports declined as
Alaskan production kicked in and as consumption started to
slump.
If Chinese domestic production falls, their net imports could
continue to increase at a rapid clip, even if the rate of
increase in their oil consumption slows.
***
It stuck me that this is the important piece as well. If
other countries can afford to pay >$100.00 then there will be a
constant economic and social reshuffling at least here in the
US. Leaving aside what can we do as some members of our society
do not have the financial means to implement efficiency and
perhaps our government can be added to that list :(. My
questioning lies in what will happen or is likely to happen.
Perhaps this was answered with the high unemployment, declining
lifestyles, and declining net worth comments above. I have
always questioned whether leaders actually 'lead' or are they
more allowed and/or tolerated. My point being Carter knew about
energy (put on a sweater) but the people didn't like or want it
'wala' here we are, fighting wars over oil and looking over the
edge.
It will be 'why didn't you tell us?'. That is your first
hurdle in talking this up. I suspect if you say - 'You didn't
listen or you were not ready to listen' - you will get stone
flat denial. It could also be accurate but also worse you were
lied to by greedy XYZ's. The unfocused social unrest has already
started. My fear is when the pinch gets tight enough someone is
going to promise some unsound or unwise pie in the sky. I feel
like I have become a spectator in some bad movie.
***
I am very much looking forward to the videos of the
presentations. A couple of weeks is rather a long time to wait.
Hopefully they'll post it soon.
I first became Peak Oil aware after reading a paper in a
Mech. Engineering course in 2002. I remember having lengthy
conversations even back then about what alternative energy
sources man might adopt. There was a special energy research
unit in my university, and one of the fellows in the department
kept bringing us round to the nature of the energy trap, and he
sensitized our minds.
Since then, the matter has been on my mind for most days.
After years of reading, documentaries, following sites like
this, I have come to a conclusion which few people who
understand the problem would reach:
It appears to me that Man NEEDS his problems. He
always needs to be on the edge of a cliff without a bridge
before him. Only then will he will have the strong spur he needs
to develop and extend his powers further. It is rather too
premature, pessimistic, and perhaps absurd, to think that when
the entire human race has its back to the wall and is facing
worldwide demobilization, starvation and dieoff, that it will
simply accept what seems like its inevitable fate. A few of us
know what we are up against. A few have seen Goliath, and for
years have steadfastly held the belief that David would be no
match for him. But David has not even arrived on the
battlefield. He has yet not shown his mettle. We do not even
know David....yet.
What if all of us turn out to be monumentally wrong? What if
the energy crisis is overcome and we end up having even more
energy than ever before? All those years of worry would have
been for nothing because we were so hopelessly blind to the
infinite potentialities of man. Of course, it's much better to
worry about a problem when no solution has as yet become visible
to our minds. But should that mean that no solution will EVER
become visible to billions of minds? Not just billions of
mediocre minds, but billions of minds who have greatly extended
the intellectual domain with the internet. Ray Kurzweil is
right. The greatest force in this world is Intelligence. We may
be temporarily deprived of our cheap and abundant energy, but
does one any presume to think that with such vast intelligence
and awareness within our reach, we will remain impoverished and
hopeless for long? If anything, this new special period which we
are about to enter will see a tremendous expansion of human
intelligence like never before.
I do not know how the next 3 or so decades will pan out. But
I do have a gut feeling about something: In 100-200 years man
WILL have UNLIMITED energy. I find it difficult to believe that
after so many generations of material poverty and suffering, man
will still be unable extended his intelligence vastly further
and finally understand energy well enough to create unlimited
amounts of it himself, without relying on a thoroughly depleted
nature. Nothing develops intelligence as rapidly as being
confronted with ever present danger. It's quite possible that
human reasoning began during the last ice age, when men were
confronted with a whole new danger and were compelled to use the
mind to come up with new responses to drastically changed
circumstance. All of history has been a fight against the
limitations of the body, of nature, of time, of space and of
mind. We have partly overcome the limitations of time and space
with mass communication and transport. We have overcome quite a
few of the limitations of nature. We have overcome many of the
limitations of the body, like disease, ailments and low life
expectancy. We have certainly overcome many of the limitations
of consciousness with the creation of an artificial intellectual
realm. All of modern history has seen been a gradual expansion
of our freedom. It is this which is the foremost desire in the
soul of man: the desire for infinite freedom. So I find it just
too difficult to believe that man will sink back into slavery to
nature, to hunger and want, when he is getting closer and closer
to perfect freedom. And the appetite for freedom grows with each
new freedom added.
So I'm betting that eventually, the energy crisis will be
overcome with the advent of a new form of energy which is
infinite. To think anything less would be to grossly
underestimate man's desire for infinity in all things.
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